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ALVAREZ V. LOPEZ: THE NINTH CIRCUIT OVEREXTENDS 
CONGRESS'S INTENDED USE OF PLENARY POWERS 






While Congress has plenary powers to impose sovereignty restricting 
statutes on tribes, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have a duty to 
interpret those statutes with the goal of respecting tribal sovereignty as 
much as possible. The Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) is a sovereignty-
restricting statute, and throughout interpreting the nuances of the ICRA, the 
courts confront many crossroads at which they must restrain themselves 
from imposing federal standards that too heavily tread on tribal sovereignty. 
The judicial duty is challenging due to the intrinsic concerns for individual 
rights shared by federal judges, which sometimes conflict with the 
community-oriented foundations of tribal jurisprudence. It is at these 
instances of conflict, however, that federal judges must show restraint when 
interpreting the ICRA against tribal courts in order to respect tribal 
sovereignty over their own personal beliefs. 
In Alvarez v. Lopez,
1
 the Ninth Circuit took a biased approach when 
answering the question of whether criminal defendant Alvarez’s rights were 
violated when the Gila Indian River Community (“the Community”) tribal 
court informed him of his right to a jury trial, but did not inform him that he 
was required to request a jury in order to receive one.
2
 As is evident by the 
venomous criticisms laid out in the majority opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
judges struggled to separate their views of federal jurisprudence from 
Congress’s goal of respecting tribal sovereignty when the tribal actions 
                                                                                                                 
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
1. 835 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. Aug. 2016). This case was originally filed on August 30, 2016, 
as Alvarez v. Tracy. However, Ron Lopez succeeded Randy Tracy as Chief Administrator 
for the Gila River Indian Department of Rehabilitation and Supervision. The court 
substituted Lopez for Tracy pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  
2. Part I of the case, exhaustion, is not discussed in this Note. This Note will focus on 
Part II of the case, habeas relief. 
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conflicted with federal procedural norms. The Ninth Circuit had a duty to 
tread lightly when imposing the ICRA upon the Community tribal court, 
but it failed to meet this duty by reading into the ICRA a mandate to inform 
the defendant of the requirement to request a jury; a requirement that is not 
supported by the canons of federal Indian law nor by the text and context of 
the ICRA.  
The delineation of power between federal and tribal governments and the 
interpretation of congressional plenary power over tribes has developed 
through cases such as Talton v. Mayes,
3
 United States v. Wheeler,
4
 Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
5
 and United States v. Lara.
6
 As discussed in 
detail below, history and precedent requires federal courts to take a 
deferential approach when reviewing tribal court cases in order to promote 
and secure tribal sovereignty. Over a century of federal precedent calls for 
restraint from reading mandates out of congressional silence, which the 
majority did not follow when it found an implicit mandate to inform. The 
ICRA provision at issue states that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers 
of self-government shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense 
punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury,”
7
 
clearly lacking an explicit mandate to inform and imposing instead a 
requirement to not deny requested jury trials.  
Along with the lack of textual and contextual support for the mandate to 
inform, the Randall balancing test employed by the majority is 
inappropriate and outdated. The appropriate test for review is provided in 
Martinez.
8
 Martinez calls for construing against the tribe only in the face of 
arbitrary and unjust tribal action.
9
 This is a highly deferential standard; 
years of precedent have held that standards of tribal courts are not replicas 
of federal standards, and in some cases the standards vary greatly.  
The opinion offers the opportunity to discuss the appropriate judicial 
application of congressional plenary powers and the appropriate method of 
construing the ICRA’s right to jury provision. Due to the lack of conformity 
with the congressional goal of respecting tribal sovereignty when 
interpreting congressional plenary powers and the use of an inappropriate 
                                                                                                                 
3. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
4. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
5. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
6. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added). 
8. 436 U.S. 49. 
9. Id. at 61. 
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balancing test, the majority erred in its decision against the Community 
tribal court.  
II. Law Before the Case  
A. Plenary Powers 
1. Constitutional Grant of Congressional Plenary Powers 
Congress, by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, 
holds plenary powers that enable it to either impose or relax restrictions on 
tribal sovereignty.
10
 The constitutional provisions from which Congress’s 
plenary powers originate are the Indian Commerce Clause
11
 and the Treaty 
Clause.
12
 Although treaty-making power is granted to the President, it is 
normally extended to authorize Congress to “deal with ‘matters.’”
13
 
Congressional plenary powers are also supported by Congress’s historical 
role in setting Indian policy.
14
 United States v. Lara reveals important 
issues that are still hotly debated today, such as whether there is truly a 
broad constitutional grant of congressional plenary powers and the 
compatibility of the doctrines of inherent tribal sovereignty and federal 
plenary powers.
15
 The relationship between the jurisdictional powers of the 
federal government and the tribes, and the application of congressional 
plenary powers, took shape in the 1896 decision Talton v. Mayes. 
2. The Tribal Relationship to the Federal Government 
The Court laid the framework for understanding the dual sovereignty that 
exists between tribal governments and the federal government in Talton v. 
Mayes.
16
 The Court held that although the tribal sovereignty of the 
Cherokee Nation is “restrained by the general provisions of the 
Constitution” and “subject to the dominant authority of Congress,” the 
Tribe’s authority did not arise out of the Constitution, as the Cherokee 
                                                                                                                 
10. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
13. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)). 
14. Id. at 201. 
15. CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIAL 235, 256 (6th ed. 2010) (referencing Justice 
Thomas’ concurrence in Lara, 541 U.S. at 214-26); see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. 
Ct. 1954, 1968-69 (2016), as revised (July 7, 2016). 
16. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
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Nation existed before the Constitution.
17
 Because the Cherokee Nation’s 
sovereignty did not arise out of the Constitution, as the federal 
government’s did, the Tribe is not bound by the Fifth Amendment.
18
  
There is an important distinction, however, between the “general 
provisions of the constitution” and other rights carried in the Constitution.
19
 
Talton, and later Wheeler, affirm the position that constitutional rights that 
act specifically as restraints on federal and state powers cannot operate on 
tribal sovereigns.
20
 Examples of rights that operate on federal and state 
powers but not on tribes include the absence of just compensation 
requirements for tribes
21
 and a lack of First Amendment rights for tribal 
members.
22
 However, the Constitution’s general provisions, those directed 
at any actor, private or otherwise, such as the Civil Rights Act and 
proscriptions against slavery, do apply to tribal sovereigns.
23
 For example, 
the Ninth Circuit has heard claims against tribal leaders alleging racist acts 
and remarks in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
24
  
3. Drawing the Line Between Sovereigns 
The Court further explained the framework for defining the line between 
tribal and federal powers in United States v. Wheeler.
25
 The Court was 
asked to determine whether the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 
Clause precluded federal courts from trying a case against a tribal member 
that included acts that had already been tried in a tribal court.
26
 The 
question boiled down to whether the Navajo Tribe’s authority to try the 
defendant in its own courts was part of the Tribe’s “inherent tribal 
sovereignty, or an aspect of the sovereignty of the Federal Government 
                                                                                                                 
17. Id. at 384 (considering the Tribe’s use of a less than twelve-member grand jury 
panel). 
18. Id. at 382-83, 385. 
19. Id. at 384. 
20. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 235 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
243 (1833); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). 
21. Barona Grp. of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Am. Mgmt. & 
Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding there is no just compensation 
requirement for tribes). 
22. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) 
(denying First Amendment rights to tribal members). 
23. Id. at 235 (citing United States v. Choctaw Nation, 38 Ct. Cl. 558 (1903), aff’d, 193 
U.S. 115 (1904); In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886)). 
24. Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989). 
25. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
26. Id. at 315-16. 
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which has been delegated to the tribes by Congress[.]”
27
 The Court 
acknowledged that the tribal interests in self-governance were similar to 
state interests in self-governance, and therefore federal preemption into 
either area would be a substantial infraction.
28
 Finding no congressional act 
or treaty that created the sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe, the Court held the 
power to try native members in tribal courts was an inherent power.
29
 “The 
powers of Indian tribes are, in general, ‘inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’”
30
 The Court outlined that 
in order for tribal sovereignty to be restricted there must either be a treaty or 
an act of Congress allowing such restriction.
31
  
[The Indian tribes’] incorporation within the territory of the 
United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily 
divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had 
previously exercised. By specific treaty provision they yielded 
up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its 
plenary control, Congress has removed still others.
32
 
The prime examples of federal statutes that impose limits on tribal 
sovereignty are the relevant sections of the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934,
33
 and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
34
 
4. The Power to Extinguish Tribal Sovereignty 
With cases such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
35
 and Duro v. 
Reina,
36
 the Court moved from standing on explicit congressional acts to 
relying on implicit inferences drawn from applicable federal statutes or 
treaties.
37
 For example, in Oliphant, the Court found that a lack of an 
explicit grant of tribal authority over non-natives equaled a lack of inherent 
                                                                                                                 
27. Id. at 322. 
28. Id. at 332. 
29. Id. at 328. 
30. Id. at 322 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (4th 
prtg. 1945)). 
31. Id. at 323. 
32. Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
33. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012). 
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
35. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
36. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
37. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 256-57, 273-74, 276. 
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authority over non-tribal members.
38
 Similarly in Duro, the Court found 
that there was an implicit divestiture of tribal power over non-members, 
natives who are not members of the governing tribe, due to the dependent 
status of tribes.
39
 Oliphant and Duro are examples of the Court seizing the 
opportunity to determine the scope of tribal self-governance. The Court 
strayed from the Wheeler analysis that relied on finding explicit grants from 
Congress, and moved to an analysis that drew implicit inferences from 
federal sources.
40
 The Court’s movement towards using implicit inferences 
to override tribal sovereignty runs the risk of overextending congressional 
plenary powers and may place the sovereignty-extinguishing power in the 
hands of the Court.
41
 Oliphant and Duro also highlight the struggle that the 
Court endures when trying to find the correct method of construction for 
federal sources that acknowledges both inherent tribal sovereignty that 
existed before the Constitution and the ability of the federal government to 
extinguish tribal sovereignty.
42
 This struggle comes to light most 
prominently when the Court interprets the ICRA. 
B. Indian Civil Rights Act 
The ICRA is an exercise of congressional plenary powers over tribal 
sovereignty.
43
 The Act grants many of the rights afforded to persons 
appearing in federal courts from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to persons appearing in tribal courts. However, the Court’s 
application of the sovereignty-restricting statute is not a total incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights.
44
 For example, when a tribal court’s criminal sentence 
gives rise to a severe restraint on a tribal member’s personal liberty, that 
member may petition federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus;
45
 access to 
federal courts is guaranteed to tribal members by the ICRA.
46
 As the Court 
has previously recognized, limitations on sovereignty can only come from 
                                                                                                                 
38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212, superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-137, 105 Stat. 646, as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205 (2004) 
(“Congress has the power to relax the restrictions imposed by the political branches on the 
tribes’ inherent prosecutorial authority.”). 
39. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). 
40. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 256-57, 273-74, 276. 
41. See id. 
42. Id. at 277 (showing Oliphant employed a historical methodology, while Duro ignored 
the historical recognition of tribal authority over non-member natives). 
43. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 327-28. 
44. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 256. 
45. Id. at 246 (citing Alire v. Johnson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Ore. 1999)). 
46. Id.  
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Congress and not from the Supreme Court; application of the ICRA creates 
a challenge for the Court to not overextend Congress’s plenary powers 
when interpreting ICRA provisions.
47
  
When interpreting the ICRA to answer the question of whether tribal 
courts have the authority to try natives who are not members of the 
governing tribe,
48
 the Court, in United States v. Lara, found that ICRA 
provisions are not delegations of federal power, but are instead an outline of 
the “bounds of the inherent tribal authority.”
49
 Subsequently, tribal actions 
taken or challenged under the ICRA are not subject to the full gamut of 
rights and restrictions conferred by the Constitution, but instead are to be 
analyzed under the scope of federally recognized inherent tribal authority.
50
 
When analyzing the ICRA provision at issue in Lara, the Court employed a 
construction method of looking at the statute’s text and legislative history.
51
 
In Lara, the Court held that it is Congress who may wield the power to 
either increase or relax restrictions on tribal authority. The ICRA provision 
at issue in Lara is an example of Congress engaging in its constitutional 
right to relax previously recognized tribal authority restrictions.
52
  
While Talton, through inference, denied application of the Bill of Rights 
in tribal courts, it still maintained the existence of congressional plenary 
powers over tribes.
53
 In an exercise of the right to restrict tribal sovereignty, 
Congress enacted the ICRA, expressly making applicable some, but not all, 
Bill of Rights provisions on tribal governments.
54
 An example of one of the 
specifically omitted provisions includes the right to free counsel.
55
 In 
addition, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez interprets the extent of the 
restrictions the ICRA actually imposes on tribes and outlines how the courts 
should analyze congressional intent.
56
  
                                                                                                                 
47. Id. at 256 (citing Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 756-57 (1866) (“[C]onferring 
rights and privileges on these Indians cannot affect their situation . . . .”)). 
48. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196, 210 (2004) (comparing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
with Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)). 
49. Id. at 207. 
50. Id. at 207, 210. 
51. Id. at 199. 
52. Id. at 207, 210. 
53. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 412 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-
84 (1896)). 
54. Id. at 412 (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 
Stat. 77). 
55. Id. at 413. 
56. 436 U.S. 49, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66-72 (1978). 
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When answering the question of tribal immunity from federal suits 
brought under the ICRA, the Court, in Martinez, rejected arguments that the 
ICRA created an implicit federal cause of action
57
. The Court called for 
“tread[ing] lightly” on tribal sovereignty when judicially interpreting 
congressional plenary powers.
58
 The Court found the sole express remedy 
of habeas corpus, reserved only for questions on tribal imprisonment, to be 
a deliberate congressional choice that the Court had no authority to expand 
by allowing additional implicit inferences.
59
 The Court reasoned that the 
ICRA was not an attempt to bring tribal governments under the full 
restrictions of the Constitution, instead it “selectively incorporated and . . . 
modified [some] of the . . . Bill of Rights [provisions] to fit the unique 
political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.”
60
 The Court 
found that imposing an implicitly created cause of action in the ICRA was 
an overextension of congressional plenary powers; finding otherwise would 
frustrate the congressional goal of protecting tribal sovereignty, would 
result in a financial burden, and lacked of basis in the legislative history and 
the discussions on the remedy issue.
61
  
Martinez provides the proper construction analysis for interpreting the 
ICRA. However, in Alvarez the Ninth Circuit relied on a balancing method 
set out in Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court.
62
 
C. The Randall Balancing Test 
The Ninth Circuit used the Randall balancing test to determine to what 
standard tribal court actions should be held during a habeas proceeding in 
federal court.
63
 This concept, derived from Eighth Circuit opinions,
64
 is 
intended to grant proper respect for tribal sovereignty while also granting 
                                                                                                                 
57. Id. at 64-66. 
58. Id. at 60. 
59. Id. at 61. 
60. Id. at 62. 
61. Id. at 58, 60, 62, 64, 66-72. 
62. 841 F.2d 897, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1988). 
63. Id.  
64. White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973) (“The tribe 
itself . . . has established voting procedures precisely paralleling those commonly found in 
our culture . . . . Here, then, we have no problem of forcing an alien culture, with strange 
procedures, on this tribe.”); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(adopting the One Feather equal protection voting holding and adding that “[w]hile the 
Indian Civil Rights Act does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes by 
specific language, we read the Act to do so by implication.”). 
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federal constitutional rights to individuals.
65
 The Randall case primarily 
focused on a question of due process, and the Ninth Circuit found that 
because the due process provision language of the ICRA “substantially 
track[ed]” the due process provision language of the Bill of Rights, federal 
constitutional standards applied.
66
 The method of looking to substantially 
tracked language is coupled with looking for tribal procedures that mirror 
procedures of Anglo-Saxon courts.
67
 Though the Randall Court premised 
its use of this construction method on the view that the substantially tracked 
language should be treated “as a conduit to transmit federal constitutional 
protections,” it hedged this statement with the Martinez statement that the 
ICRA supplies individuals subject to tribal authority with “broad 
constitutional rights” in order to prevent arbitrary and unjust tribal actions.
68
  
For tribal questions that do not substantially track procedural language 
and Anglo-Saxon court norms, the Ninth Circuit developed a weighing test 
pieced together by the dual opinions of Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes 
and Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs.
69
 Howlett provides the 
Anglo-Saxon measure, and Stands Over Bull provides the weighing 
standard: “the individual right to fair treatment under the law must be 
weighed against the clearness of the particular guarantee afforded the 
individual, taken together with the magnitude of the tribal interest as 
applied to the particular facts.”
70
 Both Howlett and Stands Over Bull were 
decided before the Supreme Court ruled on Martinez v. Santa Clara 
Pueblo,
71
 and lower courts in both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits declined 
to apply principles from Howlett and Stands Over Bull in light of 
Martinez.
72
 Because Randall is based upon outdated reasoning and, in 
                                                                                                                 
65. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976). 
66. Randall, 841 F.2d at 899-900 (citing Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 364 (9th Cir. 
1977)). 
67. Id. at 900. 
68. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978)). 
69. Randall, 841 F.2d at 900 (dicta) (citing Howlett, 529 F.2d at 238; Stands Over Bull v. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360, 375 (D. Mont. 1977)). 
70. Stands Over Bull, 442 F. Supp. at 375 (citing Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 
F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 913 (1977), rev’d by 436 U.S. 49 
(1978)). 
71. 436 U.S. 49. 
72. See MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Nev. 1993) 
(abrogating Howlett by stating that strict scrutiny review of tribal decisions is not 
appropriate after Martinez, and instead applying rational basis review); Ordinance Fifty Nine 
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 970 F. Supp. 914, 926 (D. Wyo. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Ordinance Fifty 
Nine Ass’n v. U.S. Dep't of Interior Sec'y, 163 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that to the 
extent Howlett differs from Martinez, Howlett is no longer good law); Maldonado v. Yakima 
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operation, ignores the “tread lightly” demands of both Congress and Court 
precedent, the Ninth Circuit should have relied on the construction method 
set out in Martinez. Only upon a finding of arbitrary and unjust tribal action 
should the Ninth Circuit have ruled against the Community tribal court. The 
facts of the case coupled with the appropriate standard of review from 
Martinez reveal that Alvarez’s jury rights were not violated. 
III. Statement of the Case: Alvarez v. Lopez 
A. Facts 
In 2003, a twenty-year-old intoxicated Alvarez (an enrolled member of 
the Community)
73
 went to his fifteen-year-old girlfriend’s house, struck her 
with a flashlight, and threatened her with a knife.
74
 The altercation ended 
after Alvarez also struck the girlfriend’s brother, and threatened to kill the 
entire family.
75
 Alvarez was arrested by the Community police, charged 
with assault and other related offenses, and was given a “Defendant’s 
Rights” form.
76
 This form notified Alvarez that he had the right to a jury 
trial, but did not specify that in order to invoke that right, he must request a 
jury.
77
 At trial, Alvarez represented himself, did not present a defense, did 
not ask questions, or indicate that he was interested in requesting a jury.
78
 
Alvarez was charged with assault, domestic violence, and misconduct 
involving a weapon.
79
 It is an undisputed fact that Alvarez was not notified 
that he had to request a jury trial.
80
 
B. Procedural History 
Alvarez sought relief from his tribal court conviction from the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona.
81
 The district court 
                                                                                                                 
Tribal Gaming Corp., No. CV-06-3065-FVS, 2008 WL 4459453, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 
30, 2008) (dismissing due to Stands Over Bull no longer proving federal jurisdictional basis 
in light of Martinez); Tenney v. Iowa Tribe, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(finding no jurisdictional basis from Stands Over Bull in light of Martinez). 
73. Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. Aug. 2016). 
74. Id. at 1026, 1031. 
75. Id. at 1031. 
76. Id. at 1026. 
77. Id. at 1031. 
78. Id. at 1026, 1031. 
79. Id. at 1026. 
80. Id. at 1035. 
81. Id. at 1025-26. 
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dismissed his federal habeas petition.
82
 The appellate panel affirmed the 
district court’s decision in 2014, but after rehearing, withdrew the 2014 




C. Majority Opinion 
1. Issue Framing 
“We consider whether an Indian tribe violated a criminal defendant’s 
rights by failing to inform him that he could receive a jury trial only by 
requesting one.”
84
 The majority ignored arguments set forth in the 
pleadings, which debated whether or not jury rights included in the ICRA 
mirrored the Sixth Amendment’s jury rights, and instead adopted the 
Randall balancing test due to tribal court proceedings differing substantially 




Because the text of the ICRA jury provision states “upon request” and 
because Alvarez’s interests in understanding his rights outweighs any 
Community interest, the Community violated Alvarez’s right to jury trial by 
failing to inform him of the need for an affirmative request in order to 
invoke the right to jury trial.
86
 The notice requirement is mandatory, as the 
text of the ICRA reads: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense punishable 




The majority reached its holding by analyzing the arguments under the 
Randall balancing test.
88
 The Randall balancing test pits the individual’s 
right to fair treatment against the tribe’s interest in order to evaluate a 
procedure’s compliance with the ICRA standard.
89
 The majority conceded 
                                                                                                                 
82. Id. at 1031. 
83. Id. at 1030. 
84. Id. at 1026. 
85. Id. at 1029. 
86. Id. at 1029-30. 
87. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added), quoted in Alvarez, 835 F.3d at 
1028. 
88. Alvarez, 835 F.3d at 1028-29 (citing Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 
F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
89. Id. 
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that the Randall test has never before been applied to section 202(10) of the 
ICRA, but maintained that the Randall test “sweep[s] beyond” the sections 
to which it was previously applied.
90
  
The majority concluded that Alvarez was not granted the right to fair 
treatment when he was given a form that told him he had a right to a jury 
trial, as opposed to what he actually had, which was the right to request a 
jury trial.
91
 The majority supported its position by pointing out that other 
rights listed on the form did not have to be affirmatively requested.
92
 The 
majority went so far as to state that the “Defendant’s Rights” form is 
misleading.
93
 The majority also emphasized Alvarez’s age (“barely out of 
his teens”), seventh grade education, and his lack of defense counsel during 
his arrest and trial by the Community.
94
 The majority concluded that 
Alvarez’s right to be informed of the condition attached to his right to a jury 
far outweighed any intrusion into the tribe’s interest “in using a boilerplate 
form that gives defendants a misleading picture of their rights.”
95
 
D. Kozinski Concurrence 
Circuit Judge Kozinski launched a scathing criticism of the Gila River 
Indian Community’s criminal justice system in a short concurrence, finding 
“a rat’s nest of problems with the Community’s justice system.”
96
 Kozinski 
mourned the fact that Alvarez would receive little justice from the court’s 
ruling since he had already been released from his prison sentence.
97
 
However, Kozinski hoped the Community would take this opportunity to 
rectify the list of judicial shortcomings he set out in the concurrence.
98
 
Kozinski suggested that the Community “reflect on whether it is proud to 




                                                                                                                 
90. Id. at 1029 n.5 (explaining that the Randall test was developed to analyze section 
202(8) of the ICRA but extends beyond section 202(8)).  




95. Id. at 1030. 
96. Id. at 1030 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
97. Id. at 1031. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1030. 
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E. O’Scannlain Dissent 
1. Issue Framing 
Did the Community breach Alvarez’s “right, upon request, to a trial by 
jury” under the scope of the ICRA when Alvarez never requested a jury?
100
 
The dissent called into question the majority’s use of the “unmoored” 
Randall balancing test and argued that the question before the court should 
be analyzed under the standards of the ICRA alone.  
2. Holding 
Because Alvarez did not request a jury trial, the Community did not 
violate his right to receive a jury trial upon request. The ICRA text demands 
that a jury trial be granted upon request; it does not demand that the 
defendant be notified of the need to request the right in order to invoke that 
right. 
3. Reasoning 
The dissent began by reminding the court of the basic concepts of civil 
rights in a tribal court context: tribal civil rights are guaranteed based on the 
“‘tribal bill of rights . . . and federal statues” such as the ICRA; however, 
tribal civil rights are not the same as the federal Bill of Rights.
101
 The 
dissent then explained that due to (1) the inapplicability of the Randall test, 
(2) the ICRA text, (3) the context of section 202(10)of the ICRA, and (4) 
the need to balance congressional plenary powers against tribal sovereignty, 
the Community did not violate Alvarez’s jury rights under the standards of 
section 202(10) because he did not request a jury.
102
 
a) Inapplicability of the Randall Balancing Test 
The dissent accused the majority of injecting a due process claim in 
order to employ the Randall test, which has only ever been employed in 
analyzing the ICRA’s due process standard and not in the ICRA’s jury right 
standards.
103
 The dissent critiques the majority’s lack of reasoning for 
applying the Randall test, contending the majority’s belief that “the 
                                                                                                                 
100. Id. at 1034 (O’Scannlain ,J., dissenting) (quoting Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-824, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1302(a)(6)-(8),(10) (2012)).  
101. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain ,J., dissenting) (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW § 14.03[1], at 944 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN]). 
102. Id. at 1031-37 (O’Scannlain ,J., dissenting). 
103. Id. at 1032 (citing id. at 1029 n.5). 
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language and principle of Randall sweep beyond Section 202(8)” is 
insufficient and that the “absence of reasons” is not how the court should 
decide what standard to apply to a dispute.
104
 The Randall test is even more 
inappropriate because Alvarez did not raise it as an argument, therefore, the 
Community cannot have been expected to argue against it.
105
 Lastly, the 
dissent argued that a test designed to analyze general due process rights has 
no place in the analysis of a right that is explicitly accounted for in the 
ICRA text.
106
 The dissent supported its position by citing Tom v. Sutton, 
which determined that the due process provision in section 202(8) of the 
ICRA was not to be applied to a question of indigent defense rights when a 
more specific provision, section 202(6), addressing the right to counsel, 
existed in the statute.
107
 Having argued the inapplicability of the Randall 
test, the dissent set forth the appropriate method for deciding the case: 
construe the ICRA provision in an analysis of Alvarez’s argument that the 




b) Textual Construction of the ICRA 
Alvarez’s argument that the federal standard for the right to a jury trial 
should apply is flawed because the federal Bill of Rights is not imposed on 
tribes.
109
 Instead, the Bill of Rights was used, via selective incorporation or 
modification, as a model for tribal rights.
110
 This is evidenced by the key 
distinctions between many provisions in the ICRA and the Bill of Rights.
111
 
Just as section 202(6) of the ICRA, the right to counsel at the expense of the 
defendant, does not exactly mirror the Sixth Amendment, which grants the 
right to free counsel, section 202(10) does not exactly mirror the Sixth 
                                                                                                                 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1032-33. 
106. Id. at 1033 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998); 
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 
F.3d 772, 805 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)). 
107. Id. at 1033 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Tom). 
108. Id. at 1034 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (contrasting the majority’s quick dismissal 
of Alvarez’s argument, and taking this argument as a relevant question that should be 
determined). 
109. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 
1954, 1962 (2016)). 
110. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 62 (1978)). 
111. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
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 “Subsection 202(10) expressly required a request to receive 
a jury, it did not require an impartial jury, and it did not require a jury ‘of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.’”
113
 The 
Sixth Amendment makes a jury trial a default in criminal cases, where the 
ICRA provision only grants jury rights when requested.
114
  
While the Sixth Amendment and section 202(10) are similar, they are 
intentionally different.
115
 The plain text of section 202(10) demands a 
requested jury be granted, but does not require notification.
116
 The lack of 




c) Context of ICRA Section 202(10) 
“Context reinforces that the right to receive a jury trial does not include a 
right to be notified of the need to request a jury trial.”
118
 While section 
202(10) does not contain an explicit notice mandate, its neighboring 
provision, section 301, does.
119
 Section 301 mandates that the Court of 
Indian Affairs grant the same rights to defendants as if they were appearing 
in federal court, and it also contains explicit text requiring notice of said 
rights.
120
 However, 301 pertains only to the Court of Indian Affairs, a court 
established by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for tribes who could not 
establish their own criminal courts.
121
 The lack of an explicit notice 
mandate in section 201(10), in the context of section 301, is strongly 
suggestive that Congress did not intend to impose a notice requirement on 
                                                                                                                 
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 1034 (comparing section 202(10) of the ICRA with the Sixth Amendment). 
114. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).  
115. Id. at 1032 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“ICRA . . . [‘]selectively incorporated and 
in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, 
cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.’”) (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62). 
116. Id. at 1035 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1035-36 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90–284, § 301, 82 Stat. 73, 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012))). 
120. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 301, 82 
Stat. at 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1311) (“Thus, in federally established Courts of Indian 
Offenses, a model code would assure that defendants there both have rights—the full slate of 
rights provided by our Constitution—and that they have notice of these rights.”).  
121. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 301, 82 
Stat. at 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1311); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 
n.12 (1978); COHEN, supra note 101, § 4.04[3][c], at 263-64). 
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d) Substantive Canons of Federal Indian Law 
The dissent calls for the court to “tread lightly” when interpreting federal 
statutes that affect tribal sovereignty.
123
 The dissent acknowledges that 
Congress has plenary authority over tribal officers with respect to habeas 
corpus relief,
124
 but cautions that that authority be carefully balanced with 
respect for tribal sovereignty.
125
 The dissent emphasizes that precedent 




IV. Analysis and Discussion 
The dissent is correct in every facet of its analysis and the following 
section adds an analysis of precedent that supports the dissent’s conclusion. 
Federal precedent has set a clear directive for decades: “[A]void undue 
or intrusive interference in reviewing Tribal Court procedures.”
127
 Where 
the majority gives only a passing nod to this clearly established directive, 
the dissent rests its reasoning squarely on this principle. The matter at issue 
in Alvarez was procedural. The Community’s procedural choice to employ 
a “Defendant’s Rights” form that did not specify the need to request a jury 
in order to receive a jury was squarely within the tribe’s procedural 
authority and should not be infringed upon by federal courts. Comity to 
tribal procedural decisions is demanded by the precedent set by the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs 
Reservation of Oregon,
128
 and the majority gives no reason why it should be 
abandoned.  
  
                                                                                                                 
122. Id. at 1036 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
123. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60, quoting in turn 
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60, quoting in turn McClanahan v. Ariz. State 
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)). 
127. Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation, 783 F.2d 1409, 1412 
(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 67). 
128. Id. (“Comity towards the Tribal Courts requires that deference be given to the 
procedures which those courts choose to follow.”). 
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The Randall test improperly assumed a greater plenary power than 
Congress intended because the test, in operation, imposes federal 
constitutional standards upon tribal court actions. As has been clearly 
described by decades of precedent, inherent tribal powers that are not 
delegated by Congress are not subject to federal constitutional standards.
129
 
Lara informs the courts that the ICRA is not a delegation of federal powers 
to the tribes subject to federal standards,
130
 and instead that the appropriate 
construction method is to stay within the text and the legislative history of 
the statue.
131
 The Alvarez dissent abides by the narrow construction 
standard set forth in Lara with its argument that the text of the provision at 
issue clearly lacks an informing mandate.
132
 The text of the ICRA provision 
at issue does not explicitly contain a mandate to inform. Instead, it 
commands that tribal sovereigns do not deny “the right, upon request, to a 
trial by jury.”
133
 The context of the ICRA provision also demonstrates that 
when Congress requires a mandate to inform, it uses explicit language, such 
as in section 301, applicable only to Courts of Indian Affairs and not tribal 
courts such as the Community tribal court, which mandates certain rights 
and distinctly mandates notice of said rights.
134
 Section 202 has no such 
notice mandate. Therefore, to draw a rule out of congressional silence is 
anathema to the mandate of precedent and the goals of the ICRA to secure 
and promote tribal sovereignty.
135
 
The reasoning behind the Randall test rests too much on implications 
drawn from silences,
136
 and congressional plenary powers are overextended 
when interpreted by the courts from anything but explicit statutory text.
137
 
Martinez warned against drawing implicit rules from silence when the 
Court said “[w]here Congress seeks to promote dual objectives in a single 
statute, courts must be more than usually hesitant to infer from its silence a 
cause of action that, while serving one legislative purpose, will disserve the 
other.”
138
 The Martinez Court based its reasoning on “[t]he canon of 
construction applied over a century and a half by this Court . . . that the 
                                                                                                                 
129. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). See generally United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
130. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196, 210. 
131. Id. at 199. 
132. See supra Part III.E.3.b. 
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added). 
134. See supra Part III.E.3.c. 
135. See supra Part III.E. 
136. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978); see supra Part III.E.3.b. 
137. See supra Part III.E.3.b. 
138. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added). 
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wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians is not 
to be construed to their prejudice.”
139
 The Randall test finds its roots in an 
Eighth Circuit opinion that contains troubling phrases such as this: “While 
the Indian Civil Rights Act does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of 
Indian tribes by specific language, we read the Act to do so by 
implication.”
140
 This line of reasoning runs completely contrary to the 
canon of respecting tribal sovereignty by searching only for explicit 
directives reinforced by Lara and Martinez. The application of the Randall 
balancing test is wrong due to the test’s precedential basis being supplanted 
by Martinez. The Randall test rests on cases decided before Martinez and 
their reasoning is no longer useful due to the clarity shed by Martinez. 
Although the majority claims to be applying a balancing test in lieu of 
applying federal standards, due to the difference in tribal and federal court 
proceedings, the majority’s numerous criticisms of the Community tribal 
court’s lack of federal conformity suggests otherwise.
141
 Judge Kozinski 
reprimanded the Community’s criminal court for several alleged 
shortcomings not at issue in Alvarez, such as a lack of appointed indigent 
defense counsel.
142
 The recently upheld inapplicability of the Sixth 
Amendment to tribal courts in United States v. Bryant is a shining example 
of a constitutional right that is guaranteed in federal courts but not in tribal 
courts.
143
 To reprimand the Community for employing a method of criminal 
justice that has been held to be completely within its right is acrimonious 
toward the federal and tribal delineation of sovereignty. Respecting tribal 
sovereignty means respecting differences between tribal cultural and 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. It is important for the federal government to 
remember, as the Court remembered in Bryant and the Alvarez court forgot, 
that tribal jurisprudence focuses more on community-oriented goals as 
opposed to the federal norm of fixating on the rights of the individual. What 
the Bryant Court understood is that, in cases where the tribal procedure 
most directly conflicts with federal procedural norms, it is imperative to 
temper any intrinsic beliefs and apply a deferential standard toward tribal 
                                                                                                                 
139. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (emphasis added) (citing Choate 
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (holding that construction should be liberal, not strict, 
and resolved in favor of the tribes who are the wards of the federal government)). 
140. Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973). 
141. Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
142. Id. 
143. 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (2016), as revised (July 7, 2016). 
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actions in order to achieve the congressional goal of protecting tribal 
sovereignty. 
The balancing of tribal sovereignty against the individual’s rights is an 
Anglo-Saxon construction that does not comport with the tribal culture of 
community-oriented policies. While the U.S. Bill of Rights seeks to elevate 
individual freedoms above state intrusion, many tribal cultures show a 
desire to protect community harmony by imposing responsibilities on 
individuals.
144
 Because of these differences, even similarly worded 
provisions between the Bill of Rights and the ICRA can be interpreted very 
differently between tribal and federal courts.
145
 As seen in Winnebago Tribe 
of Nebraska v. Bigfire, retaining tribal culture and identity was the 
paramount tradeoff in the decision of many tribes to accept leaving their 
ancestral homelands for reservations.
146
 The decision in Winnebago to not 
apply the federal equal protection standard to tribal governments in favor of 
tribal traditions and governing norms is an example of the restraint federal 
courts should apply when reviewing tribal cases. Martinez also discussed 
another example of the restraint required, citing Native American Church of 
North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, where it was held that the First 
Amendment’s religious freedom guarantees did not apply to tribal 
governments.
147
 Respect for tribal culture is at the root of all policies 
regarding respect for tribal sovereignty.
148
 
In addition to respecting tribal culture, there is also no need to apply an 
outdated and inappropriate balancing test because Martinez provides the 
appropriate test to apply when reviewing tribal court actions in federal 
court. Martinez commands that the ICRA provides “broad constitutional 
rights” in order to prevent arbitrary and unjust tribal actions.
149
 This broad 
grant of constitutional rights should be interpreted as a general grant, not a 
specific grant, of each Bill of Rights provision coupled with federal 
standards of constitutional review. The ICRA did not impose a total 
                                                                                                                 
144. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 408 (citing Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) 
Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799 (2007); Bruce G. Miller, The Individual, 
the Collective, and Tribal Code, AM. IND. CULTURE & RESEARCH J., vol. 21, no. 1, at 107 
(1997)). 
145. Id. 
146. 25 Ind. L. Rep. 6229 (Winn. Sup. Ct. 1998), reprinted in GOLDBERG, supra note 15, 
at 408-11. 
147. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 80 n.5 (1978) (citing Native Am. 
Church of N. Am., 272 F.2d 131, 132, 135 (10th Cir. 1959)). 
148. See id. at 62; Bigfire, 25 Ind. L. Rep. 6229, reprinted in GOLDBERG, supra note 15, 
at 409. 
149. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61. 
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incorporation of the Bill of Rights onto tribal courts. Instead, a commitment 
to tribal sovereignty led Congress to selectively incorporate the principles 
found in the Bill of Rights in order to make allowances for the customs and 
needs of the tribes. The test created in Martinez leans heavily towards tribal 
deference. As the District Court of Nevada noted, after Martinez, strict 
scrutiny is inappropriate and rational basis is the correct test to ensure 
deference to tribal sovereignty.
150
 The appropriate review of tribal actions is 
to ask whether the action was arbitrary and unjust.
151
 Based on the 
congressional goal of respecting tribal sovereignty this must be interpreted 
as a high bar against tribal incursions.
152
 The Martinez test sets a high bar 
for showing restraint when interpreting congressional plenary powers, and 
the limitation on tribal sovereignty incursions is exactly in line with the 




The “Defendant’s Rights” form’s lack of the phrase “upon request” 
hardly rises to the level of “unjust” Martinez requires before federal 
incursion is appropriate. Alvarez, as the dissent points out, had ample 
opportunity to ask questions throughout the process and during his defense 
of himself. Alvarez should have at least noticed that there was not a jury 
present, and thereby he could have indicated a desire to have a jury at that 
time. He did not request a jury, and nothing in the record shows he 
indicated to the court that he wanted one during his trial process. Therefore, 
Alvarez’s rights to a jury trial were not violated, because the court did not 
deny a request for a jury.  
  
                                                                                                                 
150. MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Nev. 1993). 
151. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61. 
152. See id. at 66-67 (“[ICRA accommodates] goals of ‘preventing injustices perpetrated 
by tribal governments, on the one hand, and, on the other, avoiding undue or precipitous 
interference in the affairs of the Indian people.’” (quoting SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: 
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 194, 89TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., at 12 (Comm. Print 1966)); Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs 
Reservation, 783 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986) (employing the Martinez mandate of 
avoiding undue intrusions into tribal sovereignty when interpreting ICRA). 
153. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60; Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975); Choate 
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675, (1912); see also Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 
2016) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
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The majority erred in its decision to read into the ICRA text a mandate 
for notice of the need to request a jury in order to invoke the right. As the 
dissent argues, to do so is a misinterpretation of the text and context of the 
ICRA and an overextension of congressional plenary powers. 
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